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In this paper we study "investment tournaments," a class of decision problems that involve gradual
allocation of investment among several alternatives whose values are subject to exogenous shocks.
The decision-maker's payoff is determined by the final values of the alternatives. An important example
of career tournaments motivating our research is the career choice problem, since a person choosing
a career often starts by investing in learning several professions. We show that in a broad range of
cases it is optimal for the decision-maker in each time period to allocate all resources to the most promising
alternative. We also show that in tournaments for a promotion the agents would rationally put forth














This paper introduces and studies a class of decision problems which we call
investment tournaments. In an investment tournament, the decision-maker
and nature choose actions across a number of periods. Every period the
decision-maker selects the level of value-enhancing investment in each of the
several alternatives available to her. The values of alternatives also change
due to random shocks (actions of nature). The payo® to the decision-maker
is determined by the ¯nal values of the alternatives.
Although investment tournaments have received little attention in the
literature, they are ubiquitous. An important motivating example of an in-
vestment tournament providing the central motivation for this paper is the
career choice problem. Indeed, consider a student deliberating whether to
major in accounting or engineering. The student will, at ¯rst, take some
courses in each ¯eld as an investment into both careers. From an ex-post
perspective, courses in accounting may not be useful for someone who even-
tually chooses engineering, but the student would only select a major after
trying several ¯elds. As times goes by, new information and labor market
shocks can change the career prospects across ¯elds. In this context, the
main question for a student choosing a career is how many courses to take
in each discipline before making the ¯nal choice of a major.1
Similarly, the contests for promotion between the employees of a ¯rm
or an organization can also be regarded as investment tournaments. In the
latter context, the ¯rms and organizations make substantial investments in
the human capital of their employees, in particular, by providing training,
coaching and mentoring.
Another example of an investment tournament is the process of new prod-
uct development. A ¯rm or a government organization often develop several
prototypes of a new product at the same time. Hence, investment dollars
have to be allocated across alternative prototypes before their performance
1Our basic investment tournament model highlights the aspects of career choice stem-
ming from the choice of investments into learning alternative professions, before the infor-
mation regarding which one of them ¯ts a person best, or has the highest value, is revealed.
Obviously, the complexity of educational choices can not be fully captured by a simple
investment tournament model. A person may take courses in various ¯elds for reasons
outside of our model, e.g. in order to satisfy intellectual curiosity or expand her/his social
network. Yet, we believe that our model captures important aspects of students' career
choices.
2(i.e. the value) becomes known. The expected performance of a prototype
is increasing in the amount of resources committed to it. If the ¯nal prod-
uct combines the features of several prototypes, then the pro¯ts of the ¯rm
would depend on the realization of several alternatives. On the other hand,
if the new product is based exclusively on the best prototype, then the ¯rm's
pro¯ts would depend only on the realization of the highest value alternative.2
In this paper, we develop a model of investment tournaments encom-
passing these and similar examples, and characterize the optimal investment
strategy. Throughout, the career choice problem remains our main moti-
vating example, and therefore we will couch the discussion in terms of this
problem.
The simplest model of an investment tournament has three periods. In
the ¯rst and third periods the values of all alternatives increase as a result
of random shocks, while in the second period the decision-maker chooses the
level of investment into each alternative by allocating a ¯xed budget across
them. The ¯nal value of each alternative is realized in the third period and is
equal to the sum of the ¯rst and the third period shocks plus the investment
received by this alternative in the second period. The payo® to the decision-
maker is determined by the ¯nal values of the alternatives.
The class of investment tournaments analyzed below is more general than
this simple three period model. In Section 2 we consider investment tourna-
ments with an arbitrary ¯nite number of periods in which the decision-maker
and the nature either alternate in taking actions or act simultaneously. The
value function is given by the weighted sum of the ¯nal values of the alterna-
tives. This multi-period model allows to demonstrate how the decision-maker
adjusts the allocation of investment between the alternatives in response to
exogenous changes in their values. For example, a student would modify the
2Various aspects of R&D investment decisions that involve developing several proto-
types of a new product are best studied by applying a combination of investment tourna-
ments and optimal search methodology. In the context of optimal search literature, the
amount of resources invested in each prototype is assumed to be exogenously ¯xed and all
prototypes are assumed equally promising. As an example of the optimal search approach,
Dahan and Mendelson (2001) study optimal prototyping strategy and R&D experimen-
tation. They investigate the optimal number of prototypes and the optimal combination
between parallel and sequential prototyping.
In contrast, in our investment tournament model a ¯rm can adjust its investment level
into each prototype depending on the preliminary (noisy) evaluations of the potential of
each prototype. Thus, investment tournament model isolates an aspect of the optimal
prototyping problem that has not been previously investigated.
3mix of courses that she takes in di®erent ¯elds, as one major becomes more
promising than another due to a demand shift in the labor market.
Proposition 1 characterizes the optimal investment strategy in such multi-
period setting. At every decision node, it calls for investing all resources into
the leading alternative with the highest current value. Thus, the optimal
strategy magni¯es the advantage of the leading alternative. However, due to
random shocks, the leading alternative at one decision node need not remain
in the lead at the next decision node. We can interpret Proposition 1 as
saying that the optimal strategy is invariably to put all eggs in the \favorite
basket," although the \favorite basket" may change over time.
Proposition 1 has a simple corollary showing that the strategy of invest-
ing only in one favorite alternative in each period remains optimal when the
decision-maker's payo® depends only on the ¯nal value of the largest alter-
native. Proposition 2 establishes that our main result continues to hold if
the payo® to the decision-maker is a sum of convex transforms of the ¯nal
values of all the alternatives.
Section 2.1 generalizes the benchmark model of investment tournaments
by allowing the returns to investment to be decreasing. We provide two types
of results. First, if the aggregate investment cost function is decreasing in the
total cost of investment, it remains optimal to invest only in one alternative.
However, if the bene¯t function is concave in the values of alternatives,
then several alternatives may receive positive investment at some decision
nodes. Even though the optimal strategy in this case is less extreme than
\putting all eggs in one basket," it is still optimal to signi¯cantly favor the
leading alternative, even if its lead is very small.
These results provide insights regarding the optimal strategy for career
choice. In particular, they explain why a student choosing between two ma-
jors may rationally devote substantially more e®ort to a ¯eld that seems
slightly more promising. At the same time, the student should not com-
pletely disregard somewhat less promising ¯elds. New information regarding
career prospects in di®erent ¯elds or shocks in the labor market can reverse
the ranking of the ¯elds and cause a student to dramatically change the
amount of time (s)he invests in each ¯eld. Thus, seemingly irrational jump-
ing back and forth between majors may be consistent with expected utility
maximization. Similarly, a ¯rm developing several prototypes of a new prod-
uct should always invest substantially more in the prototype which, at the
current moment, is more promising than the other prototypes, even if the
margin is tiny.
4Section 3 considers another application of investment tournaments to la-
bor economics. It builds upon the literature on incentive aspects of tour-
naments which was pioneered by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and was further
developed by Bhattacharya and Guasch (1988), Bull et al. (1987), Ehrenberg
and Bognannon(1990), Eriksson (1999), Ferrall (1996), Green and Stokey
(1983), Nalebu® and Stiglitz (1983), Taylor (1995), Barut and Kovenock
(1998), Krishna and Morgan (1998), Moldovanu and Sela (2001), and others.
In a standard investment tournament, the workers (who play the role of
alternatives in our terminology) are competing for a prize, usually a promo-
tion. This motivates them to exert costly e®ort because performance, and
hence the probability of winning the tournament, (stochastically) increases
with e®ort.
In our hybrid incentive/investment tournament framework of Section 3
we consider bilateral investment in the workers' human capital: both the
¯rm and the worker invest in it over the course of a promotion contest. For
example, in law ¯rms the investment into young workers' human capital takes
the form of mentoring by senior partners. Mentoring is a scarce resource
that can take the form of providing guidance and advice, being included
in meetings with important clients or being assigned to more creative and
complex projects.
A ¯rm's pro¯ts at any given time depend primarily on the average perfor-
mance of its workers. At the same time, in many contexts the ¯rm-speci¯c
capital of a worker who wins the tournament has special signi¯cance. For
instance, in an up or out tournament where the winners are promoted and
the losers are laid o®, the investments into ¯rm-speci¯c human capital of the
losing contenders are wasted from ex-post perspective.3 Therefore, the ¯rm
will be primarily interested in maximizing the human capital of the winner
in the tournament.
Proposition 5 shows that, other things being equal, a worker would exert
more e®ort in the early stages of an incentive tournament. By working hard
early in her career, the worker tries to get ahead of her/his competitors at the
beginning of the tournament. If she succeeds in this, she would obtain a larger
share of the ¯rm's investment in its employees' human capital. This improves
the worker's chances of winning the tournament and getting a promotion.
3Galanter and Palay (1991) and Rebitzer and Taylor (2007) provide an analysis of the
organizational structure of law ¯rms highlighting the role of up-or-out promotion contests,
or tournaments.
5Thus, the competition between the workers for their employer's investment in
our model explains the phenomenon of a `rat race' among young professionals.
Our explanation of a rat race is di®erent from those that one can ¯nd
in the existing literature. Indeed, the literature (cf. Akerlof (1976), Landers
et al. (1996), Andersson (2002)), has typically relied on adverse selection
and worker screening arguments to explain the rat race. `Adverse selection'
theory of a rat race implies that a typical worker will work more than an
e±cient number of hours. Since the e±cient number of hours depends on an
unobservable worker type, it is hard to test this prediction empirically. In
contrast, our theory of a rat race does not involve unobservables, and hence
it is easier to empirically test its prediction that the workers in the early
stages of their career will put in more e®ort than in the later stages.
Several contributions in the literature on promotion tournaments, in par-
ticular (Barut and Kovenock (1998), Krishna and Morgan (1998), Moldovanu
and Sela (2001)), examine the e®ect of the design of tournament prizes on
the e®orts of the contestants and provide recipes for the optimal design of
such prizes. The focus of this paper is di®erent. We concentrate on under-
standing the investment behavior by the other party in these contests- the
decision-maker, who organizers the tournaments and bene¯ts from the value
generated by the contestants. Hence, this paper puts an emphasis not on the
structure of prizes for the contestants, but on the value, or output, generated
by the contestants for the ¯rm. Another important feature, distinguishing
our approach from most contributions in the literature on tournaments, is
its dynamic nature, as we consider investment decisions made dynamically
throughout multiple periods.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces and
solves the model of investment tournaments under di®erent speci¯cations of
the decision-maker's value and cost functions. Section 3 combines investment
tournament model with the model of incentive tournaments and applies the
results to personnel economics. Section 4 concludes. The proofs are relegated
to an Appendix.
2 Model and Main Results
In this section, we formulate and solve a model of career choice as an invest-
ment tournament. To start, suppose that there are T periods over which an
individual decision-maker has to complete her or his career choice and invest-
6ments in di®erent professions. Speci¯cally, in each period this individual has
to choose how to allocate an amount B of resources (time, e®ort and money
invested into career choice in each period) among N alternative professions.
We will use the terms \profession" and \alternative" interchangeably in what
follows.4 Let bti denote the nonnegative amount of resources invested into
profession/alternative i at period t. Then the individual's investment action
in period t can be represented by a vector bt = (bt1;bt2;:::btN) lying in the
feasible action space A = fb 2 RN : bi ¸ 0;
PN
i=1 bi = Bg.
In each period the nature draws a random shock to the value of each
alternative/profession. The shocks are independent of the decision-maker's
actions. In the career choice framework, the shocks could represent changes
in expected labor market prospects or earnings in a given career. These
shocks are a crucial factor inducing the decision-maker to adjust her course
of actions because, as will be shown below, the decision-maker's optimal
strategy in every period depends on the current values of the alternatives,
The shock to the value of alternative i in period t is denoted by sti. It
is drawn from an atomless distribution F(¢) with support [0; ¹ s). Thus, the
action of nature at time t is denoted by vector st = (st1;st2;:::stN).
The shocks are independent across alternatives and across time. The in-
dependence across alternatives is justi¯ed by the fact that the alternatives
represent employment and market opportunities in di®erent sectors of the
economy. The assumptions of independence across time is made for techni-
cal convenience. Under the decision-maker's risk-neutrality, the framework
could easily be generalized to allow for any autocorrelated process by adding
the (non-zero) expected value of the future shocks to the current values of
alternative. The lowest value of a shock is normalized to 0, which is without
loss of generality as long as the lowest threshold is ¯nite and the same across
all alternatives.
Here we assume that the decision-maker and nature act simultaneously,
although the situation would be identical if they took alternating turns, with
the decision-maker being the ¯rst to move in each period. The ¯nal value of
alternative/profession i at the terminal node is the sum of all shocks and all





Let the history at time t be denoted by ht = (s1;b1;s2;b2;:::;st¡1;bt¡1).
4For simplicity of exposition, we assume that the amount of resources available for
investment is the same in each period. The results and proofs do not change qualitatively
if the investment budget was changing across periods deterministically or randomly.
7The payo®-relevant information contained in history ht can be summarized
by a vector of the current values of alternatives/professions Vt = Vt(ht) =




¿=1 b¿;i.5 We will say that alterna-
tive i is a favorite in period t if Vti ¸ Vtj for all j 2 f1;:::;ng. The values of
the alternatives in period t contain all relevant information about the history
prior to t. The winner in this problem is the alternative/profession with the
highest value at the end of period T, i.e. a favorite at the terminal node. 6
The decision-maker's payo® is determined by the values of the alternatives
at the terminal stage T and is denoted by ¦(VT1;:::;VTN). If the decision-
maker follows some strategy ¾, her expected payo® at time t can be expressed
as a function of ¾ and the current values of alternatives, ¦(Vt1;:::;VtN;¾).
We will typically assume that the decision-maker's payo® is separable in the
values of the alternatives, i.e. ¦(VT1;:::;VTN) =
PN
i=k ¹k(VTr(k)), where r(k)
stands for the alternative with the k-th highest ¯nal value. An important
special case studied below is linear value function i.e., ¹k(VTr(k)) = ¸kVTr(k)
where ¸k is a nonnegative constant with ¸k ¸ ¸k¡1 for all k = 2;:::;N.
One of the central results of this paper shows that, under a broad range
of conditions, it is optimal for an individual making her career choice (or
involved in some other investment tournament) to invest all her resources in
each period into one favorite alternative. Let us illustrate this result with a
simple example.7 Suppose that there are only two alternatives/professions.




2 g, where V
f
i is the ¯nal value
of alternative i 2 f1;2g.
Consider that there is only one period left to make investments. The
current values of alternatives 1 and 2 are V1 and V2, respectively, with V1 >
V2. The investment budget is B. If in the last period the individual makes an
investment x in the ¯rst alternative and an investment B ¡ x in the second
alternative, then her expected payo® equals
Es1;s2 maxfV1 + x + s1;V2 + B ¡ x + s2g;
where s1 and s2 are the expected values of the shocks to alternatives 1 and
2 in the last period. Let us show that it is optimal to invest the whole
budget B into alternative 1, the favorite. If the individual reallocates her
5The value at the terminal node is Vi ´ V(T+1)i.
6If there is more than one favorite alternative at the terminal node, then an arbitrary
tie-breaking rule can be used to determine the winner.
7We thank the anonymous referee for suggesting this example.
8budget increasing the investment into alternative 1 by 1 cent, then her payo®
increases by 1 cent if V1+x+s1 > V2+B ¡x+s2 and decreases by 1 cent if
V1+x+s1 > V2+B¡x+s2. Hence, after this reallocation the decision-maker's
expected payo® changes by
2Es1;s2Prob:[V1 + x + s1 > V2 + B ¡ x + s2] ¡ 1: (1)
Because s1 and s2 are identically distributed, the expression in (1) is positive
if x >
V2¡V1+B
2 and is negative if x <
V2¡V1+B
2 . So, starting from x s.t.
x >
V2¡V1+B
2 , the decision-maker can increase her expected payo® by raising
her investment into alternative 1 all the way up to B. On the other hand,
starting from x <
V2¡V1+B
2 , the decision-maker can increase her expected
payo® by raising her investment into alternative 2 all the way up to B.
This implies that all budget must be invested in a single alternative. The
symmetry of the shocks and the fact that V1 > V2 then imply that the
expected payo® from investing all budget into alternative 1, the favorite, is
greater than the expected payo® from investing all budget into alternative 2.
Generalizing this simple example, we ¯rst study a T-period career choice
problem in which the decision-maker's payo® is equal to a weighted sum
of the terminal values of all alternatives/professions i.e. ¦(VT1;:::;VTN) = P
i=k ¸kVr(k), with higher-ranked alternatives assigned higher weights, that
is ¸k ¸ ¸k¡1 for all k = 2;:::;N. In this case the decision-maker's optimal
strategy is to invest all resources into a favorite alternative/profession in
every period. Indeed, we have:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the decision-maker's payo® is given by
PN
k=1 ¸kVr(k)
where ¸1 ¸ ¸2 ¸ ¸3::: ¸ ¸N ¸ 0, and r(k) denotes the alternative with the
k-th highest ¯nal value, while Vr(k) denotes the ¯nal value of the alternative
ranked k-th at the end of the tournament.
The following strategy is optimal in the investment tournament: in period
t 2 f1;:::;Tg the decision-maker allocates all investment resources to an
alternative that is a favorite in this period. If there is more than one favorite
alternative in period t, then all resources in period t are allocated to one
of the favorites. The remaining N ¡ 1 alternatives receive zero amount of
investment in period t.
Note that any investment strategy is optimal if ¸1 = ¸2 = ¸3::: = ¸N.
However, if at least one inequality is strict, then the optimal strategy calls
for investing all resources into a favorite alternative.
9This formulation of the decision-maker's value function with ¸1 ¸ ¸2 ¸
::: ¸ ¸N is appropriate in a promotion tournament of a ¯rm which invests
in the human capital of its employees, when the promotion is based on the
employees' past performance, and the employees are given increased respon-
sibilities depending on their performance in the tournament.
An important special case of this set-up is where ¸1 = 1, ¸2 = ::: = ¸N =
0. The following corollary of Proposition 1 applies in this case.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the decision-maker's payo® is equal to the value of
the winning alternative maxfV1;:::;VNg. Then the decision-maker's optimal
strategy in period t 2 f1;:::;Tg is to invest all resources into one favorite
alternative.
The Corollary is important since there is a number of environments in which
the decision-maker cares only about the realization of the highest value alter-
native. For example, this is so in the promotion tournament with up-or-out
rule, under which only the winner gets promoted and stays with the ¯rm.
Similarly, this case applies when a student is choosing a major, or a ¯rm is
selecting a new product among several prototypes, or a person is choosing a
business or life partner among several candidates. Also, this generalizes the
auction environment introduced in Schwarz and Sonin (2001).
The case considered in Corollary 1 is related to the optimal search prob-
lem, as both are maximal problems. However, neither problem is a special
case of the other. Optimal search literature studies the optimal strategy for
investment in information acquisition, when there is a cost of obtaining infor-
mation about a particular alternative. In contrast, in investment tournament
problem the information about the value of each alternative is available at
no cost to the decision-maker, but the issue is how to allocate the investment
between alternatives.
On the other hand, when the promotion is merely a prize and does not
entail increased responsibility, all workers stay with the ¯rm whether pro-
moted or not (as in medical doctors' practices), and a worker's value re°ects
how well she has learned her trade or profession, then each worker's human
capital contributes to the ¯rm's pro¯ts in the same way. So, it is more appro-
priate to model the ¯rm's ¯nal payo® as
PN
k=1 ¹(Vk) where ¹(¢) is increasing
and convex. The latter assumptions on ¹(¢) re°ect the accelerating nature
of learning one's profession.
Surprisingly, even in this case it is optimal for the ¯rm, as the decision-
maker, to invest all resources in any period in the favorite alternative (a
10worker with the highest human capital) in that period. Indeed, we have:
Proposition 2 Suppose that the decision-maker's payo® is equal to
PN
k=1 ¹(Vk)
where ¹0(¢) > 0 and ¹00(¢) > 0: Then the decision-maker's optimal strategy is
to invest all resources in period t 2 f1;:::;Tg into one favorite alternative at
period t.
Note that Proposition 2 is not a special case of Proposition 1, because here
the value of an alternative does not depend on its rank.
These results can be applied in a variety of contexts, besides the ca-
reer choice problem. For example, consider a venture capitalist who handles
several investment projects concurrently. She faces the issue of optimal al-
location of her time and e®ort across these projects. Out results imply the
following. If the ¯nal payo® to the venture capitalist is weakly convex in the
value of each project, then in each time period she should allocate most of
her scarce time to the project that looks more promising at that moment.
Similarly, an inventor working on several potential discoveries and innova-
tions should allocate most of her time to the line of research that has the
highest chance of succeeding.
The results of Propositions 1 and 2 hold if the decision-maker and nature
take turns making their moves. The proofs remains virtually unchanged.
2.1 Extensions: Decreasing Returns and Risk-Aversion.
So far, we have assumed that the decision-maker has a ¯xed investment
budget B in each period. In this section, we consider two di®erent settings.
At ¯rst, we will consider the situation in which the decision-maker can choose
to invest any amount in every period, but the returns to investment decrease
in the total amount of investment into all alternatives. Speci¯cally, suppose
that the decision-maker's action space in period t is given by
At = fbt : bti ¸ 0 for all i = 1:::Ng:





i=1 bti), re°ecting that the returns to investment
are decreasing in the total amount of investment in a given period. The
decision-maker's payo® is equal to the ¯nal value of the winning alternative.
This model is natural when the investment involves the decision-maker's
time or e®ort, since the returns to time, or e®ort, are typically decreasing
11in the total amount of it. For example, consider a student deliberating the
choice between accounting and engineering majors. One extra course in
accounting brings a student one course closer to completing the accounting
major, regardless of whether it is a second or ¯fth course in accounting.
That is, an increase in the value of the accounting alternative from taking
one course in accounting is the same, regardless of the number of accounting
courses that a student takes in a given semester. At the same time, the
student's aggregate e®ort cost of attaining a certain performance level in a
given semester typically depends on the total number of courses that the
student takes in this semester, rather than on the distribution of courses by
¯eld.
Generalizing the proof of Proposition 1, we can show that in this case
there exists an optimal strategy bti(Vt1:::VtN) that depends only on the cur-
rent values of the alternatives. The following Proposition shows that it re-
mains optimal in any time period to allocate all resources, or e®ort, to the
favorite alternative.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the action space at each decision node is
A = fb 2 R
N : bti ¸ 0g





where C0(¢) > 0 and C00(¢) > 0 and Bt =
PN
i=1 bti. Then,
(i) an optimal strategy requires that at each decision node only one favorite
alternative receives positive investment;
(ii) the amount of optimal investment in period t is increasing in the value
of the favorite alternative at t.
This proposition con¯rms the robustness of our main result establishing
the optimality of investing only in one favorite alternative in every time
period. However, it does not imply, for example, that an individual would
not switch from one ¯eld to another in her career choice, or a student will
never switch between majors. We could observe complete switching between
¯elds or professions if the job-market situation changes and some professions
12becomes more attractive than others. The latter change would constitute an
act of nature in our model.
It is also interesting to explore to what extent our results survive under
di®erent speci¯cation of the decision-maker's value function. To explore this
case, suppose that the decision-maker's payo® is given by
Pn
i=1 ¸k¹(Vr(k)),
where ¹(:) is a concave function satisfying ¹0(:) > 0 and ¹00(:) < 0. (Recall
that r(k) is the index of the alternative with the k-th highest rank among
the terminal alternative values, and ¸i > ¸i+1 for all i 2 f1;:::;N ¡ 1g).
In this case, the decision-maker is risk-averse. It is intuitive that a risk-
averse decision-maker would make positive investments in more than one
alternative in order to mitigate the risk and smooth her payo®. However,
she would still prefer to invest a larger share of her investment budget in the
favorite alternative(s) since it (they) are more likely to have higher value at
the end of the tournament. Furthermore, the intuition suggests that when
risk-aversion is weak, the strategy of investing all resources into one alter-
native should still remain optimal. For a more precise understanding of the
optimal investment strategy, let us suppose that ¹(:) is a quadratic function.
Then we have:
Proposition 4 Suppose that the decision-maker's value function at the ter-
minal node is given by
Pn
i=1 ¸k¹(Vr(k)) where ¹(V ) = aV ¡ cV 2
2 for some
a > 0, c > 0, and r(k) is the index of the alternative which is ranked k-th.
Then the decision-maker's optimal strategy has the following properties:
(i) If ¸1 = ::: = ¸n, then the unique optimal strategy is to invest equal
amounts in all alternatives in period 1. The optimal strategy in period t is to
invest in such a way that maximizes the current value of the lowest-ranked
alternative.
(ii) If a
c is su±ciently large, and per-period budget B and the upper bound
on the support of the distribution of shocks ¹ s are su±ciently small so that
a
c > n((B + ¹ s)T + 1), then the optimal strategy of the decision-maker is to
invest all budget in a favorite alternative.
The Proposition illustrates the e®ect of the decision-maker's risk-aversion.
In particular, it indicates that the e®ect of risk-aversion is weaker when the
decision-maker cares much more about the value of the winning alternative
than the other alternatives. In contrast, the strategy of maximizing the
current value of the lowest-rank alternative allows to minimize the di®erences
between the values of alternatives. This strategy is optimal for a risk-averse
decision-maker when all alternatives have equal weight at the end of the
13tournament. Due to technical complexity, we have limited our analysis to
the quadratic case. However, we believe that these results generalize to other
payo® functions.
3 Bilateral Investment in Promotion Tourna-
ments
In this section we consider tournaments in which competing alternatives are
themselves players in the tournament and can take actions a®ecting their
values. To emphasize the active role played by the alternatives, we will from
now on refer to them as \contenders." In contrast to the previous sections,
the motivation for studying such tournaments comes not from the career
choice problem, but from competition for a promotion within an organization.
As an example, consider competition for a promotion among associates
in a law partnership or a consulting ¯rm. The decision-maker is a senior
partner or a management committee of the ¯rm. She selects the levels of
investment into contenders' ¯rm-speci¯c human capital. This may involve
dividing scarce mentoring resources among contenders, assigning them to
more or less high-pro¯le projects, etc. At the same time, the contenders
also choose the amount of e®ort or investment in their own human capital
to increase their own value. For simplicity, we assume that the tournament
is up-or-out, and so the investments into ¯rm-speci¯c human capital of as-
sociates who are not promoted are wasted from the ex-post perspective.8
However, as we have shown, the results of the previous sections hold under
a range of speci¯cations and value functions, as long as the investment in
the winning alternative is at least as useful as the investment into a losing
alternative. The results that we present below extend in a similar way.
The goal of this section is to characterize the outcome of a tournament
where the investment incentives of the decision-maker and the contenders
interact. We model this situation as follows. In every period starting from
t = 1 the contenders select nonnegative e®orts which they invest in acquiring
¯rm-speci¯c human capital. Contender i's e®ort in period t is denoted by
eti. Her cost of e®ort eti in period t is given by g(eti) > 0, where g0(eti) >
0; g00(eti) > 0 for all eti > 0. Also, in every period starting from t = 1
8Galanter and Palay (1991) provide a detailed account of the role of tournaments in
large law ¯rms in the U.S. On this topic, see also Rebitzer and Taylor (2007).
14the decision-maker selects the levels of investment into each contender. Her
action space is Ad = fbt 2 RN : bti ¸ 0
PN
i=1 bti = Bg, where bti denotes
the decision-maker's investment in contender i in period t.
We maintain the assumption that in each period the nature independently
draws a random shock to the value of each contender from an atomless dis-
tribution F(¢) over nonnegative support. A random shock to the value of
contender i in period t is denoted by sti.
Nature takes an action in period zero. In subsequent periods the na-
ture, the decision-maker and the contenders move simultaneously. Thus, the
value of contender i in period t 2 f1;:::;Tg, V t
i , is a sum of her/his own
investments, the investments by the decision-maker and random shocks up







t0=1 et0i. The terminal
value of contender i in the last period T is equal to Vi = V T
i . The history
of the game after period t 2 f1;:::;Tg is summarized by the vector of the
contenders' values (V t
1;:::;V t
N).
The contender with the highest ¯nal value wins the tournament. The
decision-maker's payo® is equal to maxfV1;:::VNg - the value of the tourna-
ment winner. The payo® of contender i, who loses the tournament, is equal to
the negative of the sum of the costs of e®ort that (s)he has invested across all
time periods, i.e. ¡
PT
t=1 g(eti). If contender i wins the tournament her/his
payo® is R ¡
PT
t=1 g(eti), where R can be interpreted as the rent associated
with winning a promotion.
Thus, a promotion tournament of this section combines an investment
tournament introduced in the previous section, where the only players are the
decision-maker and the nature, with the elements of an incentive tournament
where the players are the contenders and the nature (see Lazear and Rosen
(1981)).
The information structure of this tournament is as follows. In any period
the decision-maker observes the value of each contender in the previous pe-
riod. The contenders do not observe random shocks or the decision-maker's
investment allocation. So, in every period each contender's information set
contains only her e®orts in the previous periods. Technically, our observ-
ability assumption allows us to avoid dealing with complex dynamic game
e®ects that would arise if a contender could condition her strategy on the
full history of events.
The assumption that the agents cannot observe the value of the ¯rm-
speci¯c capital invested in them by the employer is plausible when the em-
15ployer's investment takes the form of task allocation, and the employees do
not know which tasks allow them to develop ¯rm speci¯c human capital and
hence constitute an investment by the employer, and which tasks do not
enrich their ¯rm-speci¯c human capital.
Further, the key aspect of our observability structure is that a contender
cannot observe her relative ranking among her peers. This is consistent with
reality in a number of situations. In such environments, even if the contenders
do observe investments in their own ¯rm speci¯c human capital, they may
learn very little about their position in the tournament. For example, in
professional services ¯rms junior associates may not be aware of the details
of the mentoring programs provided to other associates. An academic de-
partment may keep con¯dential the details of the research support provided
to di®erent junior members. If a contender has a di®use prior regarding the
distribution from which mentoring resources are drawn, the investments into
individual contenders become entirely uninformative.
Under the di®use prior assumption, it is possible to relax the restriction
on observability by assuming that a contender can observe the investment
that she receives from the decision-maker, but observes neither the decision-
maker's budget, nor the investments received by the other contenders. At
the same time, allowing for strategies contingent on the full history would
signi¯cantly complicate the analysis and most likely generate a multiplicity
of equilibria.
The following result characterizes symmetric Nash equilibria in this pro-
motion tournament game. The symmetry restriction only requires that all
alternatives are treated symmetrically by the decision-maker.
Proposition 5 Every symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium of a promo-
tion tournament has the following properties:
(i) in every period, the decision-maker chooses to invest all resources into
one of the favorite contenders;
(ii) the e®ort of each contender is decreasing over time.
Note that the investment strategy of the decision-maker is qualitatively
similar to her strategy in the tournament without contenders' investment.
This is so because the contenders cannot condition their behavior on the
decision-maker's actions.
On the other hand, the contenders do have an incentive to in°uence
the actions of the decision-maker. So, the contenders invest more e®ort
into improving their position at the early stages of the tournament, because
16early e®ort can attract investments from the decision-maker who would put
a promising employee on a \fast track" for a promotion. Consequently, all
contenders will put forth more e®ort at the early stages of the tournament
in order to become a leader.
Note that we have assumed that contender i's e®ort cost is separable
across periods. If her cost of e®ort was equal to Q(
PT
t=1 eti), where Q0(¢) > 0,
Q00(¢) > 0, then the decision-maker would also invest all resources into the
favorite contender in every period, and each contender would invest all e®ort
in the ¯rst period. This is so because the contenders receive no additional in-
formation after the ¯rst period. Consequently, each contender would shift all
her e®ort to the ¯rst period in a bid to receive more mentoring (investment)
from the decision-maker.
The results of this section explain the phenomenon of a \rat race" which
young professionals often have to endure and \fast track" promotion schemes
frequently used by the employers. In our model, a rat race emerges as an
outcome of a competition between the employees for the employer's invest-
ment and mentoring. This competition motivates the employees to overwork
in the initial stages of their careers. More speci¯cally, an employer's optimal
strategy of investing all resources in one favorite employee in every period
e®ectively puts this employee on a fast track for a promotion. So, a higher
e®ort by an employee early in her career increases her chances of becoming an
early favorite and thereby obtaining the bene¯t of the employer's investment
in her human capital. Plainly, our results suggest that ¯rst-year graduate
students would work harder than second-year students, and ¯rst-year asso-
ciates in a law ¯rm would put in longer hours than later-year associates.
Anecdotal evidence regarding career development appears to con¯rm that.
It is worth noting that our explanation of a rat race di®ers from those
in the existing literature. Most existing contributions explain a rat race via
adverse selection motives. This explanation was ¯rst suggested by Akerlof
(1976). Developing this approach, Landers et. al (1996) provide a model of
a `rat race' in law and other professional services ¯rms. In their model, the
employees di®er in their willingness to work, and the ¯rm wants to retain
as partners only those types who are more willing to work long hours. In
equilibrium, the hours of work serve as a screening device. The employees
who are willing to worker longer hours have to overwork substantially to
prevent imitation by the types with lower willingness to work. Landers et.
al (1996) also provide supporting evidence that the associates in law ¯rms
log in an ine±ciently high number of hours.
17These models are di®erent from the one explored in our paper. Notably,
our explanation of a rat race does not rely on asymmetric information about
the employees' productivity or willingness to work. A rat race arises in our
model as a consequence of complementarity between the employees' and the
managers' investments in the employees' human capital.
It is important to note the di®erences between the conclusions of our
theory of a rate race, on the one hand, and the adverse selection theory of it,
on the other hand. Indeed, our theory generates a testable prediction that
the workers will put in longer hours in the initial stages of their careers. In
contrast, the adverse selection theory of a rat race predicts that the young
workers will put an ine±ciently long number of hours. However, e±ciency is
hard to estimate and measure since it is determined by unobservable workers'
productivity types.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed investment tournaments that arise naturally
in career choice promotion and other contexts, such as product design. We
have shown that in every period the decision-maker will optimally allocate all
her investment resources to a single alternative, or a contender. This result
holds robustly under a variety of speci¯cations and assumptions.
In many tournaments, a contender with a small lead tends to enjoy sub-
stantially better chances of winning the tournament than other contenders.
This paper provides an explanation for why an early leader may be favored
by a fully rational decision-maker.
Applications of investment tournaments are not limited to career choice,
promotion and product design contexts, and extend beyond purely economic
domain. Indeed, our investment tournament model is appropriate for model-
ing various decisions that involve a choice between several alternatives. For
instance, investment tournaments may help to explain why people tend to
date one person at a time. Dating amounts to spending time with a potential
partner. This can be viewed as an investment into the relationship-speci¯c
value of a particular match. By Proposition 5, even if it is highly uncertain
which partner will be ultimately preferred, it is still optimal to invest dis-
proportionately into the most promising alternative. Proposition 5 predicts
that the e®ort invested into a relationship by competing contenders is largest
at the early stages of the relationship.
18Of course, the investment tournament model does not re°ect the full
complexity of career choice or the dating problem. In fact, the limitations
of the investment tournament model suggest several directions for future
research. In particular, we would like to extend the investment tournament
model to two-sided matching in which a participant on one side of the market
can make investments into individual contenders on the other side of the
market, in particular, in dating and marriage.
Also, the investment tournament model does not address search aspects
arising in career choice, dating, etc. In these and in a number of other
contexts optimal search and investment tournament approaches are comple-
mentary, as each approach highlights certain important aspects of choice. In
particular, the optimal search approach focuses on information acquisition
assuming away the possibility of investment into improving the quality of
a match. In contrast, the investment tournament model focuses on the in-
vestments into relationships. Combining search and matching models with
investment tournament models would open interesting directions in research.
We intend to pursue these directions in future work.
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A Appendix
A.1 Notation and De¯nitions.
We start with a list of notation and de¯nitions used in the proofs below.
Markov strategy: a strategy is Markov if the action in any period t depends
only on the vector of current values of alternatives Vt. For a Markov strategy
we can write ¾(Vt) instead of ¾(ht). So, when considering a Markov strategy
we will, with a slight abuse of notation, refer to the vector of the values of
alternatives Vt as history.
Extended history: e ht = (ht;bt) = (s1;b1;s2;b2;:::st¡1;bt¡1;bt)
Extended value: e Vti = Vti + bti; e Vt = e Vt(e ht) = (e Vt1; e Vt2:::e VtN). Thus, the
extended value of an alternative/profession i at time t, e Vti, as its value at the
21end of period t after the decision-maker has allocated period-t budget but
not including period-t shock.
Extended favorite: we will say that an alternative i is an extended favorite
at time t if e Vti ¸ e Vtj for any j 2 f1;:::;Ng.
Allocated investment: bti(ht;¾) (or bti(Vt;¾)) is the investment allocated to
alternative i by a pure strategy ¾, conditional on history ht (or Vt).
Expected payo®: ¦(ht;¾) (or ¦(Vt;¾)) is the expected payo® from strategy
¾ conditional on ht, (or Vt). e ¦(e ht;¾) (or e ¦(e Vt;¾)) is the expected payo®












¿¡1) and ¿ ¸ t.
Continuation strategy: For a Markov strategy ¾(:), continuation strategy in
period ¿ satis¯es ¾(h0
¿) = ¾(f(ht;h0
¿)).
Equivalence: ht is equivalent to h0
t if and only if Vt(ht) = Vt(h0
t)
Probability of winning: Pti(Vt;¾) represents the probability that alterna-
tive i wins the tournament conditional on Vt and Markov strategy ¾; Pt =
(Pt1:::PtN).
e Pti(e Vt;¾) represents the probability that alternative i wins the tournament
conditional on e Vt and Markov strategy ¾;
e Pt = (e Pt1:::e PtN).
Modi¯ed value: Vtji(±) = (Vt1;:::;V 0
ti = Vti+±;:::VtN) and e Vtji(±) = (e Vt1;:::; e V 0
ti =
e Vti + ±;:::e VtN).
Proof of Proposition 1.
First, we prove the following Lemma which allows us to focus on Markov
strategies.
Lemma 1 There exists a Markov optimal strategy ¾.
Proof. The proof is by backwards induction. Consider the last period T. An
optimal strategy in this period, ¾¤
T, prescribes such allocation of budget B
between N alternatives that maximizes the expected value of the objective.
That is, ¾¤





EF£:::£F maxfVT1 + bT1 + sT1;:::;VTN + bTN + sTNg:
(2)
Note that the expectation is taken with respect to the vector (sT1;:::;sTN).
Since the objective is continuous in (bT1;:::;bTN) and the feasible domain
22of (bT1;:::;bTN) is compact, this maximization problem has a solution - an
optimal strategy ¾¤
T. Clearly, this solution depends only on (VT1;:::;VTN),
i.e. ¾¤
T is Markov.
By Berge's maximum Theorem, the value of (2) is a continuous function
of (VT1;:::;VTN) which we denote by W T(VT1;:::;VTN).
Proceeding to period T ¡1, we can use a similar method to show that the
optimal strategy for this period, ¾¤
T¡1, is Markov. Indeed, ¾¤
T¡1 prescribes
an allocation of budget B between N alternatives, (b(T¡1)1,...,b(T¡1)N), to
maximize the expected value of the following objective:
EF£:::£FW
T(V(T¡1)1 + b(T¡1)1 + s(T¡1)1;:::;V(T¡1)N + b(T¡1)N + s(T¡1)N)
This objective is continuous in (b(T¡1)1;:::;b(T¡1)N) and the feasible domain
of (b(T¡1)1;:::;b(T¡1)N) is compact, so the maximization problem has a solu-
tion - an optimal strategy ¾¤
T¡1 which depends only on (V(T¡1)1;:::;V(T¡1)N).
Thus, ¾¤
T¡1 is Markov. Proceeding backwards through all periods to the start
of the game, we establish that the optimal strategy (¾¤
1;:::;¾¤
T) is Markov.
With Lemma 1 in hand, we proceed to prove the Proposition in two steps.
Step 1 shows that in every period, an optimal strategy requires all investment
to be allocated to one alternative. Step 2 shows that the alternative that
receives all investment in some period t is a favorite in that period.
Step 1. Let ¾¤ be an optimal Markov strategy. Recall that Vt=
(Vt1;:::;VtN) (e Vt= (e Vt1;:::; e VtN)) stands for the vector of values of alter-
natives (extended alternatives) at period t, and Vi stands for the termi-
nal value of alternative i at the end of the tournament. Note that Vi =
e Vit + sit +
PT
¿=t+1(bi¿ + si¿).
Given the information available at period t and given the decision-maker's
Markov strategy ¾¤, let ´ti(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) ´ sit +
PT
¿=t+1(bi¿ +si¿). That
is, ´ti(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) is the change in the value of alternative i between
period t after investment bti has been made and its terminal value, given that
the decision-maker uses the strategy ¾¤ and the pro¯le of random shocks in
periods t,...,T is given by (st;:::;sT). As a Markov strategy, ¾¤ depends on e V¿
for all ¿ 2 ft;:::;Tg or, equivalently, on the vector e Vt of extended alternatives
in period t and the pro¯le of random shocks (st;:::;sT). For brevity, we will
sometimes write ´ti(e Vt;¾¤) omitting the dependence on (st;:::;sT), but this
dependence is implicitly understood. So, the terminal value of alternative i
can be written as Vi(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT)= e Vti + ´ti(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT).
23Further, let Ri;r(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) denote the rank function which is equal
to 1 if the terminal value of alternative i, Vi, is r-th highest among the ter-
minal values of all N alternatives (V1;:::;VN), and is equal to zero otherwise.
Given ¾¤, Ri;r(:) depends only on the vector of values of extended alternatives
e Vt at time t and the pro¯le of random shocks in periods t,..., T.
Suppose that at period t, ¾¤ prescribes positive investments btj and btk
into alternatives j and k. Let ± 2 (¡minfbtk;btjg;minfbtk;btjg) be a small
reallocation of investment between alternatives j and k on top of what is
prescribed by strategy ¾¤. We will make this reallocation without changing
the future allocation rule, so we still use e Vt as an argument of ´ti(:) and Ri;r(:)
for all i and r 2 f1;:::;Ng. That is, after this modi¯cation the strategy ¾¤
prescribes the same actions in periods t+1,...,T as without this modi¯cation.
De¯ne the vector of perturbed terminal values Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT)
as follows:
Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) ´
(V1(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT);:::;Vj(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) + ±;:::;Vk(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) ¡ ±;:::;VN(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT)):
(3)
That is, all entries of the vector Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT), except the
j-th and k-th, are the same as in the vector V(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT), while the
j-th (k-th) entry of Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) is equal to the j-th (k-th)
entry of V(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) plus (minus) ±.
Then for any ± 2 (¡minfbtk;btjg;minfbtk;btjg), the decision-maker's ex-














¸rRk;r(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT))(Vk(~ Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) ¡ ±)
(4)
Consider (4) as a function of ±. Since btj > 0 and btk > 0 are optimal
investments, ± = 0 is an interior optimum of (4). Therefore, the ¯rst deriva-
tive of (4) with respect to ± must be equal to zero at ± = 0 while its second
derivative must be nonnegative. In the rest of the proof, we show that this is
24not the case, thereby establishing a contradiction with our original hypoth-
esis that btj > 0 and btk > 0. Indeed, the ¯rst derivative of (4) with respect








































Observe that the third and fourth terms in (5) are equal to zero. Indeed, for all












To see why (6) holds, note that
PN
i=1 Ri;r(V) ´ 1 for all r and all V, be-






@Vj = 0. Furthermore, if
@Ri0;r(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT))
@Vj 6= 0 for some i0 2 f1;:::;Ng, i0 6= j and some
(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT), then i0 and j must be the favorite (highest value) alternatives at
the terminal period T, and so Vi0(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT)) = Vj(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT)) + ±.
This establishes that the third term in (5) is equal to zero. An identical argument
establishes that the fourth term in (5) is also equal to zero.
Thus, we conclude that the derivative of (4) with respect to ± is equal to the























25where by convention we set ¸N+1 = 0.
Since ¸r ¡¸r+1 ¸ 0 for all r 2 f1;:::;Ng, in order to establish that the second
derivative of (4) is increasing in ± and hence to complete the proof, it su±ces to
show that for all r 2 f1;:::;Ng,
E(st;:::;sT)
Pr
m=1 Rj;m(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT)) is increasing in ± and
E(st;:::;sT)
Pr
m=1 Rk;m(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT)) is decreasing in ±.
To see the former, let V
f(j(±);k(¡±))
(r) denote the r-th highest entry in the vector














(r) je Vt;¾¤;±) is the probability that
alternative j is at least the r-th highest in the vector Vf(j(±);k(¡±)). This probability
is non-decreasing in ± because an increase in ± raises V
f(j(±);k(¡±))
j , the value of
alternative j, lowers V
f(j(±);k(¡±))
k , the value of alternative k, and leaves the values
of all other alternatives unchanged. By a similar argument,
E(st;:::;sT)
Pr
m=1 Rk;m(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT)) is decreasing in ±. So, the
value of (7) is increasing in ±.
Next, we will show that the alternative that receives all investment in any pe-
riod t must be a favorite. That is, if alternative i0 receives all investment in period
t, then it must be that i0 2 argmaxi2f1;:::;Ng Vti. The proof is by contradiction. So




is such that b¤
ti0 = B, b¤
ti = 0 for i 6= i0 and i0 = 2 argmaxi2f1;:::;Ng Vti.
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1. Vtj0 ¡ Vti0 < B for some j0 2 argmaxi2f1;:::;Ng Vti.
In this case, we have B > e Vti0 ¡ e Vtj0 = (Vti0 +b¤
ti0)¡(Vtj0 +b¤
tj0) > 0. Since the
optimal strategy ¾¤ is Markov and the shocks are identically distributed, the same
expected payo® can be attained by making the following alternative investment
decisions ^ bt in period t: ^ bti0 = Vtj0¡Vti0 and ^ btj0 = B¡^ bti0, ^ bti = 0 for all i 62 fi0;j0g.
That is, we have e ¦(Vt+b¤
t;¾¤) = e ¦(Vt+^ bt;¾¤). But the argument in the ¯rst part
of the proof establishes that investment ^ bt is strictly suboptimal, so b¤
t cannot be
an optimal investment allocation either.
Case 2. Vtj0 ¡ Vti0 ¸ B for some j0 2 argmaxi2f1;:::;Ng Vti. In this case,
e Vti0 ¡ e Vtj0 = (Vti0 + b¤
ti0) ¡ (Vtj0 + b¤
tj0) · 0.
Then, pick some ± 2 (0;B) and consider the following feasible allocation of
investments in period t: in period t alternative j0 receives an investment ±, and
26alternative i0 receives investment B ¡ ±. Further, suppose that in all subsequent
periods the decision-maker continues to use the same optimal strategy ¾¤ ignoring
this reallocation of investment i.e. acting as if investments b¤
t have been made in
period t.
Then, using the same computation as in Part 1 of the proof and di®erenti-
ating with respect to ±, we conclude that the derivative of the expected payo®
with respect to ±, at ± = 0, is equal to (7) with j = j0 and k = i0. The result
of Step 1 implies that the probability distribution of Vj0 ¯rst-order stochastically
dominates the probability distribution of Vi0. So (7) has a strictly positive value
for j = j0 and k = i0. That is, this reallocation of investment from i0 to j0 strictly
increases the expected payo® to the decision-maker. Hence, b¤
t is suboptimal. We
conclude that the optimal strategy requires allocating all investment to a favorite
alternative in every period.
Proof of Proposition 2.
First, the same proof as in Lemma 1 can be used to show that there exists
a Markov optimal strategy. So, let us focus on such strategies.
We proceed further arguing by contradiction as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1. Let us use the same notation and the same sequence of steps as in
Proposition 1 and only explain the steps that require a modi¯cation.
Speci¯cally, suppose that an optimal strategy in period t prescribes pos-
itive investments btj and btk into alternatives j and k, and consider a small
perturbation ± 2 (¡minfbtk;btjg;minfbtk;btjg) reallocating investments be-
tween alternatives j and k on top of what is prescribed by the optimal strat-
egy. This reallocation is made without changing the future allocation rule.



































Since (11) is positive, ± = 0 cannot be an optimal choice. So, the decision-
maker will never make positive investments in two di®erent alternatives in
any period t.
To show that an optimal strategy requires allocating all investment to
a favorite alternative in every period, apply the same argument that estab-
lishes a similar assertion in Proposition 1, with the only di®erence that in
the current case the proof has to refer to (10), instead of (7). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of part (i) of the Proposition follows the same lines as its
counterpart in Proposition 1. That it, suppose that in period t the optimal
strategy prescribes positive investments btj and btk into alternatives j and k.
On top of these investments, consider a small reallocation of investment ± 2
(¡minfbtk;btjg;minfbtk;btjg) from alternative k to alternative j in period t,
without changing either the total amount of investment in period t or the
future allocation. That is, after this reallocation our strategy prescribes the
same actions in periods t + 1,...,T, as without this reallocation. Since ± = 0
is optimal by assumption, the ¯rst-order condition (5) must still hold, and
the second-order derivative of the objective, i.e. the derivative of (5) with
respect to ±, must be nonpositive. Repeating the same steps as in the proof of
Proposition 1, we establish a contradiction by showing that this second-order
derivative is, in fact, strictly positive.
Let us now prove part (ii) of the Proposition. Suppose that i is the
favorite alternative that receives all investment under the optimal strategy
in period t. Then, we have:






Di®erentiating the decision-maker's value function, we obtain:
@e ¦(e Vt1:::e VtN;¾)
@e Vti
= e Pti(e Vt;¾) (13)
28where, as de¯ned above, e Pti(e Vt;¾) stands for the probability that alternative
i wins the tournament conditional on period t information that includes e Vt
and strategy ¾. Combining equations (12) and (13) yields:




Further, since in each period the decision-maker invests all resources into
a favorite alternative, the probability that the favorite alternative i wins




Note that C00(¢) > 0. So, as the value of the favorite alternative e Vit increases,
equation (14) will continue to hold only if Bt also increases in e Vit. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Applying the method used in the proof of Proposition 1, let ^ ¾ be an equi-
librium strategy. Recall that e Vt stands for the vector of values of extended
alternatives at time period t, and btj stands for an equilibrium investment
into alternative j at time period t. Further, Ri;r(e Vt; ^ ¾;st;:::;sT) is the proba-
bility that alternative i has rank r (i.e. that the terminal value of alternative
i, Vi, is the r-th highest among the terminal values of all N alternatives
(V1;:::;VN)). The expected value of alternative j, given the information at
time t, is equal to:








































Since the ¯rst term on the second line of the previous expression does not
depend on the strategy ^ ¾ from period t+1 on, consider only the second term.
29Recalling that sit are i.i.d. across alternatives and periods, let V ar(s) stand



























The only term in (17) that depends on the decision-maker's strategy from




Thus, the optimal strategy ^ ¾ should maximize (18).
Let us start from the last period T. The derivative of (18) with respect to
bTi is equal to: E(^ ¾;sT)
P
j2f1;:::;Ng; i6=j Vj =
P
j2f1;:::;Ng i6=j VTj+bTj. Using this
derivative, we conclude that bTi > 0 and bTj > 0 if and only if the following
¯rst-order condition holds:
VTj + bTj = VTi + bTi (19)
However, if (19) cannot hold for all pairs of alternatives (i;j) i.e. if VTj > P
i0:i06=j; VTi0<VTj
VTi0+B
#fi0:i06=j; VTi0<VTjg, then it is optimal to set bTj = 0.
This implies that the optimal strategy in period T it to allocate the budget




To show that the same strategy is optimal in any period t 2 f1;:::;T ¡1g,
proceed by induction and suppose that such strategy is optimal in all periods
starting from some t + 1. Then, E(^ ¾;st+1;:::;sT)V(t+1)i > (=)E(^ ¾;st+1;:::;sT)V(t+1)j,
implies that
E(^ ¾;st+1;:::;sT)Vi > (=)E(^ ¾;st+1;:::;sT)Vj:
Therefore, given the strategy ^ ¾ and the fact that sti an stj are distributed
identically and independently, Vti+bti > (=)Vtj+btj implies that E(^ ¾;st+1;:::;sT)V(t+1)i >
(=)E(^ ¾;st+1;:::;sT)V(t+1)j.
30We will use this property to establish the optimality of allocating invest-
ments in period t to maximize
min
i02f1;:::;Ng
Vti0 + bti0: (20)
To show this, suppose that it is optimal to make strictly positive investments
into alternatives i and j in period t. As in the proof of Proposition 1 consider
a small reallocation of investment ± ¸ 0 from j to i in period t. Recall
that this reallocation is done in such a way that the investment strategy
in the subsequent periods remains unchanged. Then, we have
@Vi
@± = 1 =
¡
@Vj
@± . Since bti and btj are strictly positive, the following ¯rst-order condition





= E(^ ¾;st;:::;sT)Vj ¡ E(^ ¾;st;:::;sT)Vi = 0
(21)
But as we have shown before, the last equality in (21)) holds only if Vti+bti =
Vtj + btj.
On the other hand, if the value of (21) is positive, i.e. if Vti + bti <
Vtj +btj, then it is optimal to set ± > 0, and hence btj must be equal to zero.
Alternatively, if the value of (21) is negative, i.e. if Vti + bti > Vtj + btj, it
is optimal to set ± < 0, and hence bti must be equal to zero. So, a positive
investment is always made into the lowest value alternative at t and, when
two alternatives i and j receive positive investments, then Vti+bti = Vtj+btj.
Consequently, the unique optimal strategy is to maximize (20).
Part (ii). Now suppose that ¸1 > 0 and ¸2 = ::: = ¸n = 0. The proof of
this part follows the proof of Proposition 1. So suppose that the equilibrium
strategy ^ ¾ prescribes positive investments btj and btk into alternatives j and k
in period t. Let ± 2 (¡minfbtk;btjg;minfbtk;btjg) be a small reallocation of
investment from alternative j into alternative k on top of what is prescribed
by ^ ¾. This reallocation is done without changing the future allocation rule.
That is, after this reallocation the strategy ^ ¾ prescribes the same actions in
periods t + 1,...,T as without it.
Recall that Rj;1(:) is the rank function equal to 1 if alternative j is the
winner at the terminal node, and equal to zero otherwise. The vector of
perturbed terminal values Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) is de¯ned in (3). All
entries of the vector Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT), except the j-th and k-
th, are the same as in the vector V(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT), while the j-th (k-th)
31entry of Vf(j(±);k(¡±))(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) is equal to the j-th (k-th) entry of
V(e Vt;¾¤;st;:::;sT) plus (minus) ±. Dropping the argument (e Vt; ^ ¾;st;:::;sT))
of Vf(j(±);k(¡±)) and Vi(:), for any ± 2 (¡minfbtk;btjg;minfbtk;btjg), the
















+E(st;:::;sT)¸1Rk;r(Vf(j(±);k(¡±)))(a(Vk ¡ ±) ¡
c
2
(Vk ¡ ±)2) (22)
Consider (22) as a function of ±. Since btj > 0 and btk > 0 are optimal invest-
ments, ± = 0 is an interior optimum of (22). Therefore, the ¯rst derivative
of (22) with respect to ± must be equal to zero at ± = 0 while its second
derivative must be nonnegative. In the rest of the proof, we show that this is
not the case, thereby establishing a contradiction with our original hypoth-
esis that btj > 0 and btk > 0. The ¯rst derivative of (22) with respect to ±
can be written as:
E(st;:::;sT)¸1
³































The second and the third lines in (23) are equal to zero. To see this note that PN




@Vj = 0. Furthermore, if
@Ri;1(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))
@Vj 6= 0 for some
i 2 f1;:::;Ng, i 6= j, then i and j must be the favorite (highest value) alternatives
at the terminal period T and so Vi = Vj + ±. This establishes that the third term
in (23) is equal to zero. An identical argument establishes that the fourth term in
(23) is also equal to zero.
Thus, we conclude that the derivative of (22) with respect to ± is equal to:
E(st;:::;sT)¸1
³
Rj;1(Vf(j(±);k(¡±)))(a ¡ c(Vj + ±)) ¡ Rk;1(Vf(j(±);k(¡±)))(a ¡ c(Vk ¡ ±))
´
(24)
The second derivative of (24) is obtained by di®erentiating (24) with respect to ±.















(a ¡ c(Vk ¡ ±))
!
(25)
Note that ERj;1(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))) · 1 and ERk;1(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))) · 1 by de¯ni-
tion. Also, ERj;1(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))) > 0 and ERk;1(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))) > 0, for otherwise
it cannot be optimal to set bjt > 0 and bjk > 0. Note that @Rj;1(Vf(j(±);k(¡±)))
and @Rk;1(Vf(j(±);k(¡±))) are concave since the probability distribution of shocks





n. So, when a
c > n((B + ¹ s)T + 1), the
value of (25) is positive. Hence it is not optimal to invest positive amounts in
two alternatives. An argument similar to the one in Proposition 1 then establishes
that in every period all budget should be invested into a favorite alternative.
Proof of Proposition 5.
First, note that a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists. Indeed, if the decision-
maker's strategy is symmetric across the contenders, then all contenders have the
same beliefs regarding the decision-maker's investments and random shocks at
every period. Therefore, every contender has the same best-response investment
function. Further, given that each contender uses the same investment function,
it is indeed optimal for the decision-maker to use a strategy which is symmetric
across the contenders. The ¯xed point of these best response functions exists by
standard argument and constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Next, let (e¤
1;:::;e¤
T) be the equilibrium e®ort investment pro¯le for each of the
contenders. Given this pro¯le and given the distribution of shocks, the decision-
maker's problem is exactly the same as in the benchmark model studied in Section
2. The only modi¯cation here is that, independently of the decision-maker's in-
vestment, the value of contender i now changes by the amount e¤
t + sti in each
period rather than by sti. So part (i) - the optimality of investing all resources in
one contender in each period- follows directly from Proposition 1.
To establish part (ii), again consider the optimal e®ort pro¯le (e¤
1;:::;e¤
T) of a
contender. Suppose that e¤
t ¸ e¤
t0 for some time-periods t and t0 s.t. t > t0. Then,
consider some contender i. Recall that the decision-maker puts all the resources
into a favorite alternative in each period. Therefore, by switching e®ort levels in
periods t and t0, contender i will keep her overall costs constant. At the same
33time, this modi¯cation raises the probability that i receives the decision-maker's
investment in period t0 and hence in all later periods. So, this deviation is strictly
pro¯table for contender i. Q.E.D.
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